Church and Sacrament
March 18, 2015
The readings this week were interesting
and challenging, bringing a deeper insight into the meaning of liturgy than I
had had before.
There were several points I was
interested in commenting on, but I will stay with the one which first caught my
attention, the treatment of “lex orandi, lex credendi” over the
centuries. Although Prosper of Aquitaine
(Maxwell E. Johnson, ed., 50-51) may have been the first to bring this term
into the theological vocabulary, the reasoning behind it goes back at least to
St. Athanasius in the fourth century, who, in his argument against the Arian
heresy, referred to the divinity of
Christ implied in the baptismal liturgy (44).
Pope
Pius IX (58-60) referred to this principle in pronouncing the dogma of the
Immaculate Conception in 1854. He said
it was a truth “generally accepted and put into practice by the faithful” (59),
although most of the passage spoke of its backing by bishops rather than by the
laity.
A
century later, Alexander Schmemann also referred to lex orandi as the basis for the third task of liturgical theology: “to
present the separate data of liturgical experience as a connected whole, as …
the ‘rule of prayer’ dwelling within the Church and determining her ‘rule of
faith’” (66). He points out that “the early
Church firmly confessed the principle lex
orandi lex est credendi” (66).
Geoffrey Wainwright, a British Methodist (date?), seems
to have been the first to open this phrase up to new developments, pointing out
that, as structured, it can mean either that the rule of prayer is the rule for
belief or vice versa (69). He formulated
the difference this way:
“Both
Catholicism and Protestantism consider that there is properly a complementary
and harmonious relation between worship and doctrine to express the Christian truth. They tend to differ on the question of which
of the two, doctrine or worship, should set the pace, and they differ
profoundly on the question of whether either or both – the Church’s worship or
its doctrine – may fall into error” (69).
Edward
Kilmartin, S.J. introduces a more nuanced contextual understanding of our
subject. He says that “the law of prayer is the law of belief and
vice-versa” (73). The law of prayer
is specifically a “pre-reflective perception of the faith,” while the law of
belief “requires the employment of theoretical discourse” (74). He points out that however orthodox a prayer
form might be, with time, changes in language and culture may give this form
meanings which it did not originally have, so it would need to be changed, not
because it was not correct when formulated, but in order to have it be
correctly understood today (74).
David
Fagerberg defines liturgical theology as “the theological work of the
liturgical assembly, not the work done by an academic upon liturgical matter”
(94). Moreover, he says that liturgical
theology is “normative for liturgical renewal because such efforts should arise
out of the tradition of the Church and not our individual preferences” (84). My first thought on reading this was that it
was too bad that this principle was not applied to the most recent English
translation of the Roman Missal, in which translators made the English be as
close to the Latin construction and vocabulary as possible. This frequently made sentences impossibly
long, complex, and grammatically incorrect.
I think this was not the
intention of the Fathers of Vatican II.
Fagerberg
does not accept either that theology should be approached through liturgy or
vice versa. Two defining attributes of
liturgical theology are: “it is theologia prima and it is found in the
structure of the rite, in its lex orandi….
It recognizes that the law of prayer establishes the Church’s law of belief”
(84).
Nathan
Mitchell takes a different point of view. As far as he is concerned, lex
orandi,lex credendi is meaningless.
It is circular, each term depending on the other. Instead, he says that “liturgy is God’s work
for us, not our work for God. Only God
can show us how to worship God” (97). “Christian
liturgy begins as ritual practice but ends as ethical performance” (98). This was a difficult reading, but I
understood it to be saying that we can prepare the liturgy all we want, but we
are not in control of the way it turns out.
It is God’s gift to us. The
meaning of the liturgy can only be seen in how our lives are changed by
it. Do we care for the needs of our
neighbors? This is the lex agendi that Mitchell refers to. Can we respond to the “subversive element of indeterminacy” that it introduces? The liturgy is a language of the body, of
gestures, singing, walking, tasting.
Mitchell ends this passage in a way that brings it
together for me:
Liturgy embodies emptiness, powerlessness – that “absence” in human life
where God’s word and ours are surrendered into mutual
presence that creates communion without
suffering confinement. Worship is inescapably embodied and iconic;
it makes us – we don’t make it.
Why? Because liturgy is the
moment when God’s own Word places itself at the mercy of the body, at the mercy
of human flesh. In liturgy, God’s Word
surrenders to world, to history and to bodies” (101).
What relation does this survey of the use of a small Latin
phrase make in my life? I guess it
explains to me why I have such a hard time accepting the dogmas about Our
Lady: the Immaculate Conception and the
Assumption (especially the latter).
In terms of my ministry, I think that it is true that the
way the group of women with whom I have been working in the prison have been
praying together for the past several months has had an effect on their
beliefs. This has not been an official
liturgy, but it has been wonderful to see.